Standardization versus Preference for Variety in Linear Cournot Oligopoly by Deroian, Frédéric & Gannon, Frédéric
Standardization versus Preference for Variety in Linear
Cournot Oligopoly
Fre´de´ric Deroian, Fre´de´ric Gannon
To cite this version:
Fre´de´ric Deroian, Fre´de´ric Gannon. Standardization versus Preference for Variety in Linear
Cournot Oligopoly. Document de Travail du Greqam n2007-10. 2007. <halshs-00366895>
HAL Id: halshs-00366895
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00366895
Submitted on 9 Mar 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
Document de Travail 
         n°2007-10 
 
 
 
STANDARDIZATION VERSUS 
PREFERENCE FOR 
VARIETY IN LINEAR COURNOT 
OLIGOPOLY 
 
 
 
Frédéric DEROIAN 
Frédéric GANNON 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
June 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardization versus Preference for Variety in
Linear Cournot Oligopoly
F. Deroian and F. Gannon
June 1, 2007
Abstract
We consider a Cournot oligopoly setting in which consumers have an intrinsic preference
for variety, while unit production costs of firms increase with the number of goods they
produce. This environment exhibits a general under-provision of variety with respect to
social welfare.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, L13, L20
Keywords: Standardization, Preference for Variety, Oligopoly
1
Standardization versus Preference for Variety in
Linear Cournot Oligopoly
F. Deroian and F. Gannon
June 1, 2007
Abstract
We consider a Cournot oligopoly setting in which consumers have an intrinsic preference
for variety, while unit production costs of firms increase with the number of goods they
produce. This environment exhibits a general under-provision of variety with respect to
social welfare.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, L13, L20
Keywords: Standardization, Preference for Variety, Oligopoly
1
1 Introduction
The rise of modern industry, epitomized by the standardization of goods in order to reduce
production costs, has led to the so-called dilemma between standardization and diversity. Con-
sumers have a generic preference for variety, but there exist substantial costs to maintain a high
level of diversity in many industries. Private producers may not be inclined to bear those costs,
leading to under-provision of diversity with respect to social optimum. The issue of endogenous
variety production has received recent attention, as empirical studies in international trade ar-
gue that variety promotes national (total factor) productivity, and thus growth (see for instance
Feenstra and Kee [2004a, 2004b], Ardelean [2006]).
This note studies the impact of the nature of industrial competition on the tendency to
under-provide variety. We investigate the point in a two-stage multi-product Cournot oligopoly
model with horizontal product differentiation. In this model, consumers have a preference for
variety, and we assume that when the number of goods produced by a firm increases, the cost
of producing a unit of each good also increases. In stage one firms choose a number of goods to
produce; in stage two they compete in quantities. We find that the tendency to under-provision
is a general phenomenon, except in the polar cases of independent markets and homogenous
markets.
Our paper contributes to the traditional I.O. literature on consumer preference for variety,
dated at least from Chamberlin (1933), pursued thereafter in models with monopolistic compe-
tition (Dixit and Stiglitz [1977], see also d’Aspremont et al. [1996] and Benassy [1996]). Our
main conclusion follows Meade (1974), who focuses, in the monopoly case, on the role of scale
economies in the under-provision of variety (our model does not integrate scale economies of
production). Interestingly, Gabszewicz (1983) shows that firms may produce less variety than
the social optimum apart from any cost phenomena; this is explained by demand conditions
which allow a higher extraction of the consumer surplus, the smaller the number of products.
Our model also recalls Koenker and Perry (1981), who show that for many forms of imperfect
competition an unregulated industry can provide either too few or too many brands as compared
to the social optimum, depending on the relative strength of two opposite forces: the degree of
product substitutability on one hand, and the scale economies of production on the other hand.
Recently, Anderson and De Palma (2006) consider variety provision in a model of monopolistic
competition with endogenous entry. The dynamics of entry typically entails too many firms
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with few products per firm.
Our model contributes to the literature on Cournot (multi-product) oligopolies, appropriately
extended to our specific technological environment (i.e., one more variety increases unit produc-
tion cost of all goods produced by the firm). A recent formulation of this model can be found
in Sutton (1997), Symeonidis (2003a,b). We depart from these works with respect to marginal
costs, assuming that firms can choose the number of their produced goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes formally the model, section 3 summa-
rizes the optimal choices of firms, in terms of equilibrium quantities as well as number of goods.
Section 4 focuses on welfare implications. The last section presents all proofs.
2 The model
We set up a two-stage model in which consumers have a preference for variety, while firms’ unit
production costs increase with the number of goods.
We consider an industry with a fixed number N ≥ 2 of firms. Each firm produces a set of
goods. We will use indices i = 1, · · · , N for firms and k = 1, · · · , n for products. The to-
tal number of goods is n =
∑N
i=1 ni. We denote ~n = (n1, · · · , nN ); furthermore, if n−i =
(n1, · · · , ni−1, ni+1, · · · , nN ), we may write ~n = (ni;n−i). The technology of production entails
no fixed cost. To account for the fact that the launching of a new product line generally implies
high overhead costs, we assume that the marginal cost that firm i bears for each product is
positively correlated to the number of goods ni she is producing; for simplicity we assume that
marginal costs are homogenous across both firms and goods. Common extra costs may also re-
veal intra-organizational change that affect all product lines. In a linear version, c(ni) = γ0+γni,
with min(γ0, γ) > 0. In order to guarantee interior solutions we also assume max(γ0, γ) < 1.
For convenience, we shall denote ψ = 1−γ0γ .
There are S consumers, whose utility derived from consuming quantities x1, . . . , xn of the n
goods is given by:
U(x) =
n∑
k=1
(
xk − x2k
)− 2σ n∑
k=1
∑
l<k
xkxl +M
in the region where marginal utilities (on each product) are nonnegative, i.e. xk ≤ 12−σ
∑
l 6=k xl.
The consumer’s inverse demand for good k is then pk = 1 − 2xk − 2σ
∑
l 6=k xl. Firms compete
in quantity, i.e. we will restrict ourselves to the Cournot-Nash equilibria of the game.
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The timing of the game is as follows. In the first period, firms independently choose the number
of goods they produce. In the second period, they compete in quantities. We search for the
subgame perfect Cournot-Nash (pure strategy) Equilibria of the game.
To assess the preference for variety of consumers in this model, we select the following preference
for variety parameter (see Benassy [1996]):
ν(q;σ) =
U(q, ..., q)
U(nq, 0, · · · , 0)
This index compares the respective utility gains from concentrated versus distributed quantities
among available goods. We obtain in our setting ν(q;σ) = 1 + (1−σ)(n−1)q1−nq , with the constraint
that marginal utilities are nonnegative, i.e. q ≤ 12n (which is the constraint on U(nq, 0, · · · , 0),
and noticing that the constraint on U(q, ..., q) is weaker). We can therefore state that:
Claim 1 There is strict preference for variety for any σ < 1, with quadratic increase in q, while
there is no preference for variety at σ = 1.
3 The optimal choices of firms
We use backward induction to solve the game.
3.1 The second stage subgame
Standard computation provides the second stage equilibrium quantity of each product of firm
i (Cournot quantities, profits and consumer surplus, should be denoted f∗(~n;σ, ψ,N), f =
xi, pii, CS; for convenience we shall abuse the notation twice: we forget parameters ψ,N and in
the symmetric case we replace vector ~n with integer µ). We obtain:
x∗i (~n;σ) =
1
2(2(1− σ) + σni)
(
1 +
∑N
j=1
σnj
2(1−σ)+σnj
)
×
[
1 +
N∑
j=1
j 6=k
σnjc(nj)
2(1− σ) + σnj −
(
1 +
N∑
j=1
j 6=k
σnj
2(1− σ) + σnj
)
c(nk)
]
Assuming that the equilibrium quantities of all goods owned by firm i are identical, the first order
conditions indicate that the equilibrium price of product k owned by firm i is given by p∗k(~n;σ) =
4
2x∗k(1−σ+σni)+c(ni). Cournot profit is therefore given by pi∗i (~n;σ) = 2S(1−σ+σni)ni·x∗i (~n;σ)2.
That is,
pi∗i (~n;σ) =
S(1− σ + σni)ni
2(2(1− σ) + σni)2
(
1 +
∑N
j=1
σnj
2(1−σ)+σnj
)2
×
[
1 +
N∑
j=1
j 6=k
σnjc(nj)
2(1− σ) + σnj −
(
1 +
N∑
j=1
j 6=k
σnj
2(1− σ) + σnj
)
c(nk)
]2
This interior equilibrium is obtained under the second order conditions on quantities, positive
equilibrium profits, and nonnegative marginal utilities.
3.2 The full game
The general analysis is cumbersome (starting with an arbitrary distribution of number of prod-
ucts ~n, the number of products n∗i maximizing firm i’s profit must be extracted from an order-6
polynomial, an order-5 one if approximating by differentiation). Focusing on symmetric equilib-
ria, we determine Cournot quantities as x∗(µ;σ) = γ(ψ−µ)2(2−2σ+σ(N+1)µ) under the constraint µ < ψ,
and Cournot profits as
pi∗(µ;σ) =
Sγ2µ(ψ − µ)2
2
· 1− σ + σµ
(2− 2σ + σ(N + 1)µ)2
The condition of nonnegative marginal utilities is written as γ(ψ − µ)(1 + σ(µN − 1)) ≤ 2(1−
σ) + σ(N + 1)µ; it can be written ψ ≤ γσNµ2+[γ(1−σ)+σ(N+1)]µ+2(1−σ)γ[1+σ(µN−1)] . The condition holds if
the RHS is greater than 1, which obtains when γ < 1.
Lemma 1 For all N ≥ 2, pi∗(µ;σ) is either decreasing or single-peaked (increasing and then
decreasing) with respect to the variable µ.
In our analytic treatment, the equilibrium number of products per firm µ∗(σ) is approximated
by continuization of µ. The expression µ∗(σ) is the unique positive root of an order-3 polynomial
equation. The analytic solution exists (using for instance the Cardan method) but is tedious to
write, so we do not present it here. We state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any value of σ ∈]0, 1[, the equilibrium number of products per firm decreases
when the inverse measure of horizontal product differentiation increases.
Though not straightforward to prove, this result is intuitive. A higher inverse measure of product
differentiation entails more competition between firms, inducing a smaller equilibrium number of
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products per firm. Note that the result is true for all values of ψ, that is for any productivity loss
resulting from variety. Further, an immediate comparative statics indicates that the Cournot
number of products per firm decreases with N .
To finish, the polar cases σ ∈ {0, 1} have a unique and symmetric equilibrium in number of
product per firm: when σ = 0, pi∗i (~n; 0) =
Sγ2
8 ni(ψ − ni)2, and given that ni < ψ (positive
equilibrium quantity), there is a unique interior solution n∗i =
4ψ−3−
√
4ψ2−3
6 . When σ = 1,
pi∗i (~n; 1) =
Sγ2
2(N+1)2
(
ψ+n− (N +1)ni
)2, entailing that Cournot profit is declining with ni: there
is no preference for variety when σ = 1, so producing variety only (negatively) impacts unit
production costs; hence n∗i = 1 for every firm i.
4 Consumer surplus and welfare analysis
This section examines the extent to which the Cournot number of products is smaller or greater
than the one maximizing the social welfare. Given that the social welfare is the sum of aggregate
profits and consumer surplus, it is sufficient to focus on consumer surplus, which writes as follows:
CS(~n, σ) = S
n∑
k=1
(
xk − x2k − pkxk
)
− 2Sσ
n∑
k=1
∑
l<k
xkxl
As for firms’ profits, tractability issue forces us to focus on the symmetric number of goods µ
per firm (the polar cases σ ∈ {0, 1} will be treated exhaustively). Recalling the expression of
Cournot quantities, we obtain the consumer surplus:
CS∗(µ;σ) =
Sγ2Nµ(ψ − µ)2
4
· 1− σ + σNµ
(2− 2σ + σ(N + 1)µ)2
As in lemma 1, we can state that
Lemma 2 For all N ≥ 2, CS∗(µ;σ) is either decreasing or single-peaked.
We now turn to the comparison between the Cournot number of products per firm and the
distribution of products which maximizes consumer surplus.
Proposition 2 For any value of σ ∈]0, 1[, and considering homogenous distributions of num-
ber of goods per firm, the value µ˜ maximizing consumer surplus is not smaller than the one
maximizing firms’ profits.
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The following table illustrates that firms under-provide variety with respect to social welfare, for
a specific value of the cost for variety parameter ψ = 33 and for inverse measure of horizontal
differentiation σ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.5}:
N 2 3 4 5 6 10 25
µ∗(0.05) 7 6 5 5 4 3 1
µ˜(0.05) 8 8 8 7 7 6 5
µ∗(0.1) 6 5 4 3 3 2 1
µ˜(0.1) 7 7 6 6 6 5 4
µ∗(0.5) 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
µ˜(0.5) 3 3 3 3 2 2 1
The polar cases σ ∈ {0, 1} represent extremal situations in which we will show that (i) there
is a unique optimal distribution of products per firm, (ii) this distribution is homogenous and
(iii) this distribution is aligned with that which maximizes consumer surplus.
When markets are independent, the Cournot consumer surplus is written
CS∗(~n; 0) =
Sγ2
16
(
ψ2n+ 2ψ
n∑
k=1
nk +
n∑
k=1
n2k
)
As
∑n
k=1 nk =
∑N
i=1 n
2
i and
∑n
k=1 n
2
k =
∑N
i=1 n
3
i , we obtain that CS
∗(~n; 0) = 12
∑N
i=1 pi(ni).
When markets are homogenous, the Cournot consumer surplus is written after computation1
CS∗(~n; 1) = S
(
γ(Nψ−n)
2(N+1)
)2
. Denoting by µ¯ the average number of product per firm, we find
that CS(µ¯+1; 1)−CS(µ¯; 1) ≥ 0 iff µ¯ ≥ ψ− 12 , which violates the positive equilibrium quantities
condition µ¯+1 ≤ ψ. Hence, when markets are homogenous, the consumer surplus is independent
of the distribution of the number of goods per firm and is decreasing with the total number of
goods in the industry.
1The Cournot consumer surplus is written CS∗(~n; 1) = S
`
(1− p∗)Pnk=1 x∗k−Pnk=1 x∗2k − 2Pnk=1Pl<k x∗kx∗l ´,
with p∗ = 1+Nγ0+nγ
N+1
(we notice p∗k = p
∗ for all products k) and x∗k =
γ
2(N+1)nk
`
ψ − (N + 1)nk + n
´
. Denoting
X =
Pn
k=1
P
l<k x
∗
kx
∗
l and Z =
γ(ψ−n)
2(N+1)
, we obtain X = (n−1)nγ
2
8
− (n−1)NZγ
2
+Z2
Pn
k=1
1
nk
P
l<k
1
nl
. Remarking
that
Pn
k=1
1
nk
P
l<k
1
nl
= N
2
2
− 1
2
PN
i=1
1
ni
, we can rewrite X = (n−1)nγ
2
8
+ (n−1)NZγ
2
+ Z
2
2
„
N2 −PNi=1 1ni
«
.
Given that
Pn
k=1
1
nk
= N and that
Pn
k=1
1
n2
k
=
PN
i=1
1
ni
, and replacing X by its expression, we obtain after
rearrangement that CS∗(~n; 0) = 1
2
PN
i=1 pi(ni).
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5 Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. We can write 2
γ2S
pi∗(µ;σ) = g(µ) · h(µ;σ), with g(µ) = µ(ψ − µ)2 and
h(µ;σ) = 1−σ+σµ
(2−2σ+σ(N+1)µ)2 . Function g is increasing and then decreasing (given that µ < ψ). We
note that h is decreasing and convex. For simplicity, we will treat µ as a continuous variable.
We denote for convenience f ′x =
∂f(x)
∂x . Then, pi
′
µ > 0 if and only if
g′µ
g >
|h′µ|
h . First pi
′
µ > 0
requires g′µ > 0, which implies µ < µ∗|σ=0 (when σ = 0, h(µ; 0) is constant). Second, g
′
µ
g >
|h′µ|
h
if and only if
ψ − 3µ
µ(ψ − µ) >
σ
(
σ(N + 1)µ+ 2(1− σ)N
)
(1− σ + σµ)(2− 2σ + σ(N + 1)µ)
or after development (like profit functions, we abuse the notation y(σ, ψ,N) for y = a, b, c, d for
convenience, denoting y(σ)):
a(σ)µ3 + b(σ)µ2 + c(σ)µ+ d(σ) < 0 (1)
with a(σ) = 2σ2(N + 1), b(σ) = σ(1 − σ)(N + 9), c(σ) = (1 − σ)(ψσ(N − 3) + 6(1 − σ)),
d(σ) = −2ψ(1− σ)2. Equivalently, we may write
a(σ)µ2 + b(σ)µ+ c(σ) <
−d(σ)
µ
(2)
Since a(σ) > 0, b(σ) > 0 and d(σ) < 0, the LHS is positive and increasing while the RHS
is positive and decreasing: there is a unique intersection at a positive number; this number is
µ∗(σ). Therefore, when µ > 1, profit is either decreasing or single-peaked in µ. 
Proof of proposition 1. We divide the proof in five parts: (i) N = 2 when σ < 12 , (ii) N = 2
when σ > 12 , N = 3 and N ≥ 4 when ψ < 3N−5N−3 , (iii) N ≥ 4 when σ < 12 , (iv) for all N ≥ 5
when σ > 12 and N = 4 when σ > 0.6, (v) N = 4 when σ ∈ [0.5, 0.6],
(i). Assume N = 2, σ < 12 . Fix some admissible ψ and µ. Then, pi(µ) > pi(µ+ 1) iff
[1−X(σ;µ)]ψ2 − 2[(1−X(σ;µ))µ+ 1]ψ + (µ+ 1)2 −X(σ;µ)µ2 < 0 (3)
with X(σ;µ) = µµ+1
(1−σ+σµ)(2+σ+3σµ)2
(1+σµ)(2−2σ+3σµ)2 . We check that for all µ, all σ ≤ 0.5, both X(σ;µ) < 1
and ∂X(σ;µ)∂σ > 0
2. The greatest root of equation (3) is written ψ”(σ;µ) = µ+1−X(σ;µ)µ+
√
X(σ;µ)
1−X(σ;µ) .
2X(σ;µ) < 1: indeed, we obtain after little computation that X(σ;µ) < 1 iff (3µ2−13µ+4)σ2+(8µ−8)σ+4 >
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We find that this root is increasing in σ: ∂ψ”(σ;µ)∂σ > 0 iff
∂X(σ;µ)
∂σ ·
(
2 +
√
X(σ;µ) − X(σ;µ)).
Since X(σ;µ) < 1, we obtain that the sign of ∂ψ”(σ;µ)∂σ > 0 is that of
∂X(σ;µ)
∂σ > 0, and thus it is
positive.
Furthermore, the smallest root is written ψ′(σ;µ) = µ+1−X(σ;µ)µ−
√
X(σ;µ)
1−X(σ;µ) . We find that this
root is decreasing in σ: indeed, ∂ψ
′(σ;µ)
∂σ > 0 iff
∂X(σ;µ)
∂σ ·
(
2 −X(σ;µ) −√X(σ;µ)) > 0. Since
X(σ;µ) < 0, we obtain that the sign of ∂ψ
′(σ;µ)
∂σ > 0 is the opposite of that of
∂X(σ;µ)
∂σ .
Then we are done: if for some σ0 we have pi(µ) > pi(µ+ 1), then it is the case for any σ1 > σ0
(see figure 1).
Figure 1: Separation loci of pi(µ), pi(µ+ 1); X-axis: σ - Y-axis: ψ′(σ;µ), ψ”(σ;µ)
(ii). Given that the RHS of inequality (2) is decreasing in σ, a sufficient condition is that
(3µ2− 5µ)σ3. This last inequality is implied by (3µ2− 13µ+4)σ3+(8µ− 8)σ+4 > (3µ2− 5µ)σ3, or equivalently
(8µ− 4)σ(1− σ2) + 4(1− σ) > 0, which is true. Further, ∂X(σ;µ)
∂σ
> 0: indeed, since X(., .) > 0, we can study the
sign of its logarithmic derivative, which implies ∂X(σ;µ)
∂σ
> 0 iff 2
»
3µ+1
2+σ(3µ+1)
− 3µ−2
2+σ(3µ−2)
–
> µ
1+σµ
− µ−1
1+σ(µ−1) , with
both RHS and LHS being positive quantities. This inequality reduces as 3σ2µ2+3σ(4−3σ)µ+2(1−σ)(4−σ) > 0.
Expressed as a polynomial in µ, the greatest root exists for all σ and it is easily seen to be negative, implying
that the derivative is positive.
9
the LHS is increasing. Now, the derivative of the LHS is written a′σ(σ)µ2 + b′σ(σ)µ+ c′σ(σ) and
a′σ(σ) > 0 for all σ > 0 (denoting for convenience y′σ =
∂y(σ)
∂σ , y = a, b, c). When the discriminant
of this order-2 polynomial expression in µ is negative, we are done; otherwise, we notice that
the smallest root is negative, while the greatest root is smaller than 1 whenever√
(1− 2σ)2(N + 9)2 − 16(N + 1)σ[(1− 2σ)(N − 3)ψ − 12(1− σ)] < 8σ(N+1)+(1−2σ)(N+9)
i.e.
σ
[
N − 1− ψ(N − 3)] > −1
2
(N − 3)(1 + ψ) (4)
First note that the condition is valid when N = 3 or when N = 2 if when σ > 12 . Second, for
N ≥ 4, if ψ < N−1N−3 , we are done; if ψ ≥ N−1N−3 , equation (4) is written σ < (N−3)(1+ψ)2[ψ(N−3)−(N−1)] ,
whose RHS is greater than 1 as soon as ψ < 3N−5N−3 .
(iii). Suppose that µ∗(σ) is locally increasing. This means that the derivative of the order-3
polynomial expression given in equation (1) is locally negative around µ∗(σ). Noticing that
a′σ =
2
σa, b
′
σ = b · 1−2σσ(1−σ) , c′σ = c− 6(1− σ)(3− σ) + ψ(N − 3)(σ2 − 3σ + 1) and d′σ = − 2d1−σ , we
obtain that a′σµ3 + b′σµ2 + c′σµ+ d′σ < 0 iff
µ >
1
(1− σ)(3− σ)
[
aµ3
3σ
+
(1− 2σ)bµ2
6σ(1− σ) +
(
c+ ψ(N − 3)(σ2 − 3σ + 1))µ
6
− d
3(1− σ)2
]
(5)
As µ3 ≥ µ2 ≥ µ, when σ ≤ 12 inequality (5) implies µ > Y · µ− d3(1−σ)3(3−σ) with
Y =
2(1− σ)a+ (1− 2σ)b+ σ(1− σ)c+ σ(1− σ)(σ2 − 3σ + 1)ψ(N − 3)
6σ(1− σ)2(3− σ)
As d < 0, inequality (5) is therefore invalid if Y ≥ 1, which means
4σ(N+1)+(1−2σ)(N+9)+(1−σ)[6+σ(ψ(N−3)−6)]+(N−3)ψ(σ2−3σ+1) ≥ 6(1−σ)(3−σ)
i.e. N − 3 + 2σ(N − 1)ψ(N − 3)(1− 2σ) ≥ 0. This inequality holds when σ < 12 .
(iv). We show that pi(1;σ) > pi(2;σ) when ψ > 2. Since we know from the point (ii) that the
case ψ < 3N−5N−3 is covered and that
3N−5
N−3 > 2 for all N > 0, we will be done.
The inequality pi(1;σ) > pi(2;σ) writes:
(ψ − 1)2
[2− 2σ + σ(N + 1)]2 >
2(1 + σ)(ψ − 2)2
[2− 2σ + 2σ(N + 1)]2
that is, (X − 1)ψ2 − 2(X − 2)ψ + X − 4 > 0, with X = 21+σ ·
(
1+σN
2+σ(N−1)
)2. The associated
reduced discriminant is positive and equal to X. We note that X < 4: indeed, X < 4 iff
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7+ 6Nσ+ (N2+4N − 6)σ2+2(N − 1)2σ3 > 0, which is true for any N > 1. We also note that
X > 1 for all N ≥ 5 and for N = 4 if σ ≥ 0.6: indeed, X > 1 iff N2 − 2N + 1 − 2(1+σ)
σ2
> 0.
Note that ∆′ = 2(1+σ)
σ2
> 0, and N” = 1 +
√
2(1+σ)
σ . We check that N” < 5 for all σ ∈ [0.5, 1],
and for N” < 4 when σ < 0.6 (N”(σ) is decreasing in the interval, from 4.46 to 3).
In the region where X > 1, obtaining pi(1;σ) > pi(2;σ) requires ψ > ψ”, with ψ” = X−2+
√
X
X−1
(ψ′ < 0 as X < 4). To finish, we remark that ψ” < 2 iff X > 1.
(v). We obtain after little development that pi(1;σ) ≥ pi(2;σ) iff ψ ≤ ψc(σ), with ψc(.) increasing
in [0.5, 0.6] and ψc(0.5) ' 98.49. So we are done if ψ ≤ 98.
Furthermore, pi(3;σ) ≤ pi(2;σ) iff (B−1)ψ2−2(2B−3)ψ+4B−9 ≥ 0, withB = 16
(
1+σ
1+2σ
)(
2+13σ
1+4σ
)2.
We notice that both B − 1 > 0 and 4B − 9 < 0 for σ ∈ [0.5, 0.6]. Then we need ψ ≥
2B−3+
√
(2B−3)2−(B−1)(4B−9)
B−1 . A straigthforward inspection indicates that this latter RHS is
smaller than 3 for all admissible values of σ. Then, for ψ > 98, µ∗(σ) ≤ 2 in [0.5, 0.6].
The result follows. Let us assume some exogenous value ψ. As ψc(.) is increasing in σ, if
pi(2;σ0) < pi(1;σ0) for a given value σ0 in [0.5, 0.6], then for any σ1 > σ0, pi(2;σ1) < pi(1;σ1);
and if pi(2;σ0) > pi(1;σ0) for a given value σ0 in [0.5, 0.6], then for any σ1 > σ0, it cannot be the
case that pi(2;σ1) < pi(3;σ1). 
Proof of lemma 2. The proof is similar to that of lemma 1. Replacing adequately function
h(µ;σ) with function l(µ;σ) = 1−σ+σNµ
(2−2σ+σ(N+1)µ)2 , we notice that l is decreasing and convex, and
g′µ
g >
|l′µ|
l if and only if
ψ − 3µ
µ(ψ − µ) > σ
2− 2σ + σN(N + 1)µ
(1− σ + σNµ)(2− 2σ + σ(N + 1)µ)
or after development
A(σ)µ2 +B(σ)µ+ C(σ) <
−D(σ)
µ
(6)
with A(σ) = 2σ2N(N + 1), B(σ) = σ(1− σ)(9N + 1), C(σ) = (1− σ)[6(1− σ)− ψσ(3N − 1)],
D(σ) = −2ψ(1 − σ)2. We have A(σ) > 0, B(σ) > 0, D(σ) < 0, so the LHS in inequality (6) is
increasing while the RHS is decreasing; that is, the two curves have a unique intersection when
µ > 0. 
Proof of proposition 4. The Cournot consumer surplus can be written
CS∗(µ;σ) =
N
2
(
1− σ + σNµ
1− σ + σµ
)
pi∗(µ;σ)
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Then,
∂CS∗(µ;σ)
∂µ
=
∂pi∗(µ;σ)
∂µ
(
1− σ + σNµ
1− σ + σµ
)
+ pi∗(µ;σ)
(
σ(1− σ)(N − 1)
(1− σ + σµ)2
)
We conclude that if ∂pi
∗(µ;σ)
∂µ > 0, then
∂CS∗(µ;σ)
∂µ > 0. Recalling by lemma 1 that pi
∗(µ;σ) is
single-peaked, the result follows. 
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